Saturday, July 1, 2017

TIBET EQUILIBRIUM - SIKKIM GATEWAY TO TIBET'S INDEPENDENCE

TIBET EQUILIBRIUM - SIKKIM GATEWAY TO TIBET'S INDEPENDENCE




In 1910, Ch'ing or Qing China dispatched a military expedition to attack Lhasa to arrest the Great 13th Dalai Lama's aspirations for Tibet's Independence. He escaped to India. While living in Sikkim, the Dalai Lama directed attacks on Chinese forces in Lhasa forcing them to leave Tibet. He returned to Lhasa and took advantage of the downfall of Qing Dynasty in China. On February 13, 1913, Tibet declared Full Independence. 

Rudranarasimham Rebbapragada
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162 USA
SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE

The Evil Red Empire-Map of Tibet.jpg



Tibet Equilibrium-Sikkim-Gateway to   Tibet.png



MAJOR GENERAL SHERU THAPLIYAL'S ACCOUNT OF INDO-CHINESE CLASHES IN 1967. 



Tibet Equilibrium-Nathu La Pass,   Sikkim.jpg



Indian and Chinese Armies clashed alongside Sikkim Tibet border on
11–14 September 1967 at Nathu La & 1 October 1967 at Cho La.  Indian Army beat the Chinese badly with heavy casualties to Chinese and established strong control over Nathu La and Cho La. The Chinese were driven back 3km at Cho La.

Following is an account of Maj. Gen Sheru Thapliyal, (Retd.) who commanded the Nathu La brigade and an Infantry division in the Ladakh sector.
.



After the debacle of 1962, nothing could have enhanced the self esteem  of the Indian Army than the mauling that was given to the Chinese at  Nathu La in Sikkim on 11th September 1967 and at Chola on 1st October  1967. It must have come as a rude shock to the Chinese Army and also its  political leadership. And by a happy coincidence, the Indian Army  leadership which got the better of this eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation  was the same that went on to create Bangladesh in 1971. Maj Gen Sagat  Singh was GOC Mountain Division in Sikkim, Lt Gen Jagjit Aurora was the  Corps Commander and Sam Manekshaw was the Eastern Army Commander.

I too served in Nathu La. After finishing my young officer's course, it  was on 21 July 1967 that I reported to my Unit, a mule pack artillery  regiment in Sikkim. Those days young officers were made to have their  professional mailing by sending them on long-range patrols (LRP) for  area familiarisation, take part in khad race to increase their stamina  and sending them to remote observations ports on Sikkim-Tibet border for  a month. Having done my share of LRPs and having taken part in the khad  race, I was sent to the main Sabu La observation post on the  Sikkim-Tibet Border. This observation post is about a kilometre  south-west of Nathu La. It dominates Nathu La by virtue of taking on  higher ground and commands an excellent view of the pass as also the  Chinese defense on the feature known as North shoulder. There were two  observation posts at Sabu La and had a good old radio set 62 and PRC-10  and of course line communications to the guns deployed in the rear.

Nathu La at 14200 feet is an important pass on the Tibet-Sikkim border  through which passes the old Gangtok-Yatung-Lhasa Trade Route. Although  the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is well defined by the Anglo-Chinese  Convention of 17 March 1890, the Chinese were not comfortable with  Sikkim being an Indian protectorate with the deployment of the Indian  Army at that time. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the  Chinese gave an ultimatum to India to vacate both Nathu La and Jelep La  passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border. For some strange reason, the Mountain  Division, under whose jurisdiction Jelep La was at that time, vacated  the pass. It remains under Chinese possession till date. However, Lt.  Gen Sagat Singh, true to form, refused to vacate Nathu La. Incidentally  it is at Nathu La where Chinese and Indian forces are deployed barely  thirty yards apart, closest anywhere on the 4000 km Sino-Indian border  and the border remains undemarcated. Chinese hold the northern shoulder  of the pass while Indian Army holds the southern shoulder. Two  dominating features south and north of Nathu La namely Sebu La and  Camel's back were held by the Indians. Artillery observation post  officers deployed on these two features have an excellent observation  into Chinese depth areas whereas from Northern shoulder, Chinese have  very little observations into Indian depth areas. This factor proved  crucial in the clash that ensued. At the time of the clash, 2 Grenadiers  was holding Nathu La. This battalion was under the command of Lt Col  (Later Brigadier) Rai Singh. The battalion was under the Mountain  Brigade being commanded by Brig MMS Bakshi, MVC.


The daily routine at Nathu La used to start with patrolling by both  sides along the perceived border which almost always resulted in  arguments. The only one on the Chinese side who could converse in broken  English was the Political Commissar who could be recognised by a red  patch on his cap. Sentries of both the forces used to stand barely one  meter apart in the centre of the Pass which is marked by Nehru Stone,  commemorating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's trek to Bhutan through Nathu La  and Chumbi Valley in 1959. Argument between the two sides soon changed  to pushing and shoving and on 6 September 1967 a scuffle took place in  which Political Commissar fell down and broke his spectacles. These  incidents only added to the excitement. I developed excellent rapport  with Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and a few days before the clash we had  gone to Gangtok together on "liberty" to see a movie. Little did I know  that within a week, Dagar would be a martyr.

In order to de-escalate the situation it was decided by the Indian  military hierarchy to lay a wire in the centre of the Pass from Nathu La  to Sebu La to demarcate the perceived border. This task was to be  carried out by the  jawans of 70 Field Company of Engineers  assisted by a company of 18 Rajput deployed at Yak La pass further north  of Nathu La. The wire laying was to commence at first light on the  fateful morning of 11 September 1967.

That morning dawned bright and sunny unlike the normal foggy days. The engineers and jawans started erecting long iron pickets from Nathu La to Sebu La along the  perceived border while 2 Grenadiers and Artillery Observation Post  Officers at Sebu La and Camel's Back were on alert. Immediately the  Chinese Political Commissar, with a section of Infantry came to the  centre of the Pass where Lt. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was standing  with his commando platoon. The Commissar asked Lt Col Rai Singh to stop  laying the wire. Orders to the Indian Army were clear. They were not to  blink. An argument started which soon built up into a scuffle. In the  ensuing melee, the commissar got roughed up. Thereafter the Chinese went  up back to their bunkers and engineers resumed laying the wire.

Within a few minutes of this, a whistle was heard on the Chinese side  followed by murderous medium machine gun fire from north shoulder. The  pass is completely devoid of cover and the jawans of 70 Field  Company and 18 Rajput were caught in the open and suffered heavy  casualties which included Col Rai Singh who was wounded. He was awarded  MVC later. Two brave officers – Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and Major  Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput rallied a few troops and tried to assault  the Chinese MMG but both died a heroic death. They were posthumously  awarded Vir Chakra and MVC respectively. 2 Grenadier opened small arms  fire on North shoulder but it was not very effective. Within the first  ten minutes, there were nearly seventy dead and scores wounded lying in  the open on the pass. Within half an hour, Chinese artillery opened up  on the pass as well as in the depth areas but it was mostly prophylactic  fire due to lack of observation and failed to do much damage. Meanwhile  we as artillery observation post officers asked for artillery fire,  permission for which came a little later. Because of excellent  domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel's back, artillery fire  was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder  and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy  casualties which by their own estimates were over 400. The artillery  duel thereafter carried on day and night. For the next three days, the  Chinese were taught a lesson. On 14 September, Chinese threatened use of  Air Force if shelling did not stop. By then the lesson had been driven  home and an uneasy ceasefire came about. The Chinese, true to form, had  pulled over dead bodies to their side of the perceived border at night  and accused us of violating the border. Dead bodies were exchanged on 15  September at which time: Sam Manekshaw, Aurora and Sagat were present  on the Pass.

Every battle has its own share of heroism, faint heartedness, drama and  humour. The Nathu La skirmish was no exception. 2 Grenadiers were  initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to their CO  but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went  round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted  as Captain on the spot. On the lighter side was one artillery  observation post officer, my colleague at Sebu La whose radio set was  damaged due to shelling and he was out of communication with his guns.  He rightly decided to go back to the base at Sherathang in the depth to  get another radio set. While he was on his way back, Commander Artillery  Brigade was coming up. He stopped the young captain, accused him of  running away from the battle and sent him back after reducing him to his  substantive rank of a second lieutenant. Casualties could not be  evacuated for three days and nights as any move to do so invited a hail  of Chinese bullets. Some wounded may well have succumbed to cold and  rain. There were awards for bravery as also court martial for cowardice.  However, what stood out was the steadfastness of the commanders and  bravery of the jawans and junior officers. Indians refused to blink and the mighty Chinese dragon was made to look ordinary.

The situation again flared up twenty days later when on 1 October 1967 a  face-off between India and China took place at Cho La, another pass on  the Sikkim-Tibet border a few kilometers north of Nathu La. Despite  initial casualties, 7/11 GR and 10 JAK RIF stood firm and forced the  Chinese to withdraw nearly three kilometers away to a feature named Kam  Barracks where they remain deployed till date. Cho La Pass is firmly in  Indian hands. Indian Army had got better of the Chinese yet again.

No wonder, Sino-Indian border has remained peaceful ever since to the  extent that today Chinese soldiers come and ask their Indian  counterparts at Nathu La for cigarettes, rum and tea, mail is exchanged  twice in a week in a hut constructed specially for this purpose and  border personnel meeting takes place there twice a year. It was my  privilege to command the Nathu La Brigade many years later and conduct  the first border personnel meeting at Nathu La is 1995.

Tibet Equilibrium-Sikkim-Balance of   Power.jpg


Tibet Equilibrium-Chinese   Intrusion-Sikkim.jpg


Tibet Equilibrium-China in   Tibet.jpg


Tibet Equilibrium-Chinese   Intrusions.jpg


Tibet Equilibrium-Chinese Missile   Deployment in Tibet.jpg

#TibetEquilibrium - Qing Empire   1820.png







Saturday, April 8, 2017

CHINA MINUS TIBET EQUALS TO POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN SOUTHERN ASIA

CHINA MINUS TIBET EQUALS TO POWER EQUILIBRIUM IN SOUTHERN ASIA




President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, with they ...

To deal with problems of Red China's Economic, Political, Military, Maritime, and Nuclear Expansionism, I have to address the problem of Red China's Territorial Expansionism. Red China gained 965, 000 square miles of Tibetan Territory through military occupation. In terms of size, Tibet is the second largest nation in Southern Asia, almost as large as Republic of India( over 1, 269, 221 square miles).

Evicting Tibet's military occupier is the first step that will restore Balance of Power in Asia and I name this process as 'TIBET EQUILIBRIUM' for Tibetan Territory is the Key for Political, Economic, Military Imbalance that is undermining International Relations.
 
Rudranarasimham Rebbapragada
Ann Arbor, MI 48104-4162 USA
SPECIAL FRONTIER FORCE








 

 
 


Today's WorldView
Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Palm Beach, Fla., on Thursday for an unorthodox meeting at President Trump's Mar-a-Lago estate. The presidents and their wives are scheduled to spend about 24 hours together, including a Thursday night dinner and a working lunch the following day.
The first meaningful discussions between arguably the two most powerful people on the planet are, of course, hugely significant. Trump spent a large chunk of his election campaign attacking China's supposedly unfair trade and fiscal practices, which he promised would be challenged by a more protectionist and nationalist Trump presidency. Xi, meanwhile, is meeting the erratic U.S. president at a time when his own political future at home is not as secure as some might think. 
Trump has already signaled this may be a tough encounter. But, as my colleague Simon Denyer wrote last week, it's quite likely Xi has come bearing gifts — "a package of pledges designed to give the U.S. president some 'tweetable' promises to present as victories." Whether this translates into long-term wins for either leader is less clear. Either way, here are the main storylines to watch:
The question of trade
"We can't continue to allow China to rape our country," declared Trump on the campaign trail last year. He was talking about the United States' considerable trade deficit with China and Beijing's history of currency manipulation. Part of Trump's pledge to revive blue-collar American jobs explicitly involved punishing China on the world stage.
This was a major departure from previous U.S. administrations, both Republican and Democratic, which embraced the dogma of open markets and sought to make China a reliable partner within — not an opponent to — an American-led international order. Earlier this year, as the world readied for Trump's inauguration, Xi cast himself as a custodian of that order, defending globalization, open borders and free trade — all things Trump campaigned against — at the World Economic Forum. Xi's rhetoric received mixed reviews, but it underscored the strange new paradigm shaping global relations.
Ahead of Xi's visit this week, China's state media attempted to make the case for normal bilateral ties. "U.S. job losses are not China's fault," read a Xinhua commentary on Wednesday. The next day, another piece argued that China's trade surplus "does not necessarily mean China benefits while the United States loses." Xinhua went on: "About 40 percent of the trade surplus is actually generated by U.S. companies in China."
Ironically, as economic experts note, Trump's protectionist agenda is more in line with China's own practices, including its boosting of mammoth Chinese state-run companies.
"Mr. Trump seems to want to move the U.S. toward China's approach, rather than move China toward the U.S. approach of open trade and globalization," said Eswar Prasad, a professor of trade at Cornell University, to my colleague Ana Swanson. "He seems to want the U.S. to be more like China than China to be more like the U.S. And I'm not sure that's the best path for the U.S. to go down."
A magazine featuring President Trump on display with Chinese military magazines at a newsstand in Beijing on April 4. (Mark Schiefelbein/Associated Press)
A magazine featuring President Trump on display with Chinese military magazines at a newsstand in Beijing on April 4. (Mark Schiefelbein/Associated Press)
The question of security
There will be a Kim Jong Un-shaped elephant in the room in Mar-a-Lago. Amid a flurry of North Korean missile tests, the Trump administration is keen on getting China — Pyongyang's only real friend — to bring the pariah state to heel. Trump and other senior administration officials have signaled their impatience with North Korea and threatened unilateral action in the past week.
"The clock is very, very quickly running out," a senior White House official told reporters. "All options are on the table for us."
This may all be bluster intended to pressure Beijing, which has cast itself as the honest broker between the North Koreans and the United States — much to American chagrin. Washington's longstanding frustration with what it perceives as China's unwillingness (or inability) to rein in North Korea will also run up against other geopolitical disagreements, including differences over China's expansionist role in the South China Sea and the status of Taiwan.
On all these fronts, it's likely the Xi-Trump meeting will yield polite sound bites — and few real changes to the tense status quo.
The question of strategy
In the short term, Trump may emerge from Mar-a-Lago having burnished his credentials as a budding statesman — a pleasant photo-op here, a nice headline there. Xi, who will return home as the Communist Party is preparing for a cabinet reshuffle, has to walk a difficult line and "lose face" in the eyes of the global media and the Chinese public.
But in the long term, Western observers see an alarming drift in the course of U.S.-China relations.
"The problem lies in Mr. Trump's transactional view of the world. He prefers deals to something as necessarily ill-defined as global leadership," wrote Financial Times columnist Philip Stephens. "Hence the decision to repudiate the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement that would have checked Beijing's advancing economic influence in the western Pacific and handed Washington important strategic leverage."
"As recently as four years ago, Xi and other Chinese leaders fretted, publicly and explicitly, that their people were being seduced by the moral glamour of American democracy — by the openhearted confidence of the 'shining city on a hill' and by the ability of a nation founded on slavery to elect its first African-American President," wrote the New Yorker's Evan Osnos. "Xi worried that the American example of competence, generosity, and contempt for authoritarianism would, someday, drive his own people to challenge the rule of the Communist Party. Xi has less reason to worry about that today."